INTROD UCTOR Y ^

of apple, to whatever object is of a red tint, and to everything

which has fallen from a higher to a lower level.

It is impossible intelligently to utter the simplest sentence

no savage could even say " Spear broken!" without making

use of highly abstract ideas. Indeed, the highest and most

abstract of all ideas, that of " being " or " existence," is neces-

sarily implied in every statement we make and every question

we ask. Again, no progress in science is possible without

apprehending degrees of likeness and unlikeness, perceptions

as to which constitute the basis of all classification. But

neither " likeness " nor " unlikeness " can, of course, exist by

itself in the concrete, and no single object taken by itself

can be either one or the other. But as with likeness, so with

every relation in which one object or action can possibly stand

to another object or action, we can only apprehend it by

means of an abstract idea, and as all science consists of a

study and comprehension of " relations," so all science is

essentially abstract although derived from, and accurately

applicable to, real concrete states of real concrete things.

" Thoughts " in one sense are concrete, individual mental

(or psychical) realities, as truly as a heap of stones are con-

crete physical realities. But the meaning of a thought and

its oral expression e.g., " triangle " or " apple " is (as just

said) abstract. Nevertheless, it is not purely mental, but

refers to real things which constitute the " class " to which

the abstract term refers the class of triangles and the class

of apples each real concrete member of each such class

possessing the real concrete characters referred to by the

abstract term. Thus these " thoughts " so considered are

not simply mental any more than simply physical. They

are ideas which have their roots in the real concrete

character of real concrete things. Therefore what we

mainly make use of are these activities of a mixed nature

in essence psychical and in reference, generally, physical.

of apple, to whatever object is of a red tint, and to everything

which has fallen from a higher to a lower level.

It is impossible intelligently to utter the simplest sentence

no savage could even say " Spear broken!" without making

use of highly abstract ideas. Indeed, the highest and most

abstract of all ideas, that of " being " or " existence," is neces-

sarily implied in every statement we make and every question

we ask. Again, no progress in science is possible without

apprehending degrees of likeness and unlikeness, perceptions

as to which constitute the basis of all classification. But

neither " likeness " nor " unlikeness " can, of course, exist by

itself in the concrete, and no single object taken by itself

can be either one or the other. But as with likeness, so with

every relation in which one object or action can possibly stand

to another object or action, we can only apprehend it by

means of an abstract idea, and as all science consists of a

study and comprehension of " relations," so all science is

essentially abstract although derived from, and accurately

applicable to, real concrete states of real concrete things.

" Thoughts " in one sense are concrete, individual mental

(or psychical) realities, as truly as a heap of stones are con-

crete physical realities. But the meaning of a thought and

its oral expression e.g., " triangle " or " apple " is (as just

said) abstract. Nevertheless, it is not purely mental, but

refers to real things which constitute the " class " to which

the abstract term refers the class of triangles and the class

of apples each real concrete member of each such class

possessing the real concrete characters referred to by the

abstract term. Thus these " thoughts " so considered are

not simply mental any more than simply physical. They

are ideas which have their roots in the real concrete

character of real concrete things. Therefore what we

mainly make use of are these activities of a mixed nature

in essence psychical and in reference, generally, physical.